

**GAMING POLICY AND ENFORCEMENT BRANCH
INVESTIGATIONS AND REGIONAL OPERATIONS DIVISION
REPORT OF FINDINGS**

Comment [jm1]: This is more than a report of findings, conclusions are being drawn

This is the format for reporting that has been used since our inception in 2001 and includes providing recommendations and conclusions. JS and JVG

dramatic and ongoing increase in suspicious cash coming into predominantly Lower Mainland casinos.

No comment JS

Comment [jm2]: I think we need to be careful here as there may be other reasons for the increase in reporting behavior.

In the Action Plan to Review Money Laundering Measures at BC Gaming Facilities of August 22, 2011 authored by Robert Kroeker, under Recommendation #2 it was noted that *"BCLC should enhance training and corporate policy to help ensure gaming staff do not draw conclusions about the ultimate origin of funds based solely on the identification of a patron and his or her pattern of play. Training and business practices should result in gaming staff having a clear understanding that the duty to diligently scrutinize all buy-ins for suspicious transactions applies, whether or not a patron is considered to be known to BCLC or the facility operator."*

Comment [jm3]: This and the following two paragraphs appear to provide the policy direction re AML. Suggest we put a header in here to be clear

In future we can change the format if needed. JS

To date, neither BCLC nor the service providers have taken any steps to "diligently scrutinize all buy-ins for suspicious transactions".

Comment [WJM4]: What is the basis of evidence for saying that BCLC or the casino service providers (CSP's) have not taken ANY steps to scrutinize buy-ins for suspicious transactions?

To provide clarity, please refer to Page 6, last paragraph. "The "Know your Client" requirement of the Service Provider at the present time is not sufficient and does not include the critical component of knowing and carrying out appropriate and extensive "Due Diligence" on the origin of the source of the large amounts of suspicious cash funds" coming into gaming facilities. JS

Statistical Overview:

To review and address important concerns and statistics the AML X-DWG continues to look at:

- 1) The number of Sec. 86 Reports on SCT's for the noted years were:

2008/09 – 103

2009/10 – 117

2010/11 – 459

2011/12 – 861

2012/13 – 1,062

Comment [WJM5]: These are fiscal years. The actual 2012 calendar year had 1173 S.86 reports. It must be noted that there are several factors that need to be considered when we look at the increase in this reporting. This includes the potential actual increase in suspicious traffic, enhanced training and increased diligence in requiring CSP's to identify and report.

The above are fiscal year stats. We have not referred to calendar year stats. We also believe CSPs are not now reporting everything and we believe a future audit report will indicate that service providers are not reporting all SCTs (especially under \$50,000). JS

2013 (first 9 months) – 840 Projected for full year - 1,120

We agree slightly less but all of our comparisons in this report are fiscal year stats. Either way, the volume of SCT cash continues to escalate. JS

Comment [WJM6]: A calendar year over year comparison shows 2013 to have less S.86 report filings than the previous year.

- 2) Initiatives and strategies implemented to help reduce the amount of suspicious currency coming into casinos in BC and developing alternatives for bringing cash into these casinos:

Player Gaming Fund Account – 2009
Hold Cheque Policy – April, 2012
Convenience Cheque Policy – April, 2012
Debit allowed – May, 2012

For WJM7: This was not intended to be an exhaustive list of alternatives. Please refer to Page 5 and 6. In concert with the AML strategy the Branch allowed a number of enhancements that allowed gamblers easier access to legitimate cash (cash machines) on the casino floor. The Policy also included easier access to funds by allowing the gambler the ability to electronically transfer funds from existing bank accounts into their casino PGF account. However, those initiatives along with other initiatives have not reduced the volume of suspicious cash nor the number of Suspicious Currency Transactions in BC Casinos."

Comment [WJM7]: In addition to the initiatives noted we have also approved buy-ins with cheques from other Canadian casinos, buy-ins with funds drawn on top tier U.S. bank accounts, the use of internet transfers into PGF accounts, and loading PGF accounts with certified cheques and verified win cheques.

Comment [JM8]: This info should follow the info on the previous page as they represent the responses to the policy direction and aren't stats.

For JM8: This is simply the way this report was structured. JS

- 3) Tracking of suspicious currency statistics and denominations of bills started in 2010 and provide the following statistical information:
July 01, 2010/June 30, 2011 (1 year period) - \$39, 572,313 with 75% being in \$20.00 bill denomination

January 01, 2012 to December 31, 2012 (1 year period) - \$87,435,297 with 68% being in \$20.00 bills
- 4) For the present year (statistics from January 01, 2013 to September 30, 2013 (9 month period), the following SCT data has been reported:

\$71,196,398 with 67% or \$47,989,675 in \$20.00 denomination

Projecting forward to a full calendar year will equate to the following estimates for the year 2013:

\$94,928,530 with approx. 67% in \$20.00 denomination

For WJM9: We agree. JS

For JM10: This report was not intended to be an in-depth analysis. It was for information purposes to place this issue in context. JS

Comment [WJM9]: This projection is just under a 9% increase over the 2012 calendar year, with virtually the same percentage of \$20 bills.

Comment [jm10]: We should put this info in a table as easier to read and see trends.

- 5) That projected total would again show an approximate 8% overall increase from 2012 and the total amount of SCT's is coming very close to 100 million dollars per year.

The significance is that almost \$100 Million in SCT's have been reported to the regulator. JS

Approximately 75% of that total currency is being accepted predominantly at one venue, the River Rock Casino and the majority of that suspicious currency is being brought in by some 35-40 patrons.

Comment [jm11]: What is the significance of \$100M other than it is a big number?

Refer to comments in JM10 "this report was not intended to be an in-depth analysis. It was for information purposes to place this issue in context." JS

There is no question that most of the large sums of cash currency coming into casinos, and especially the small denomination cash currency (\$20.00 bills), is being brought in by patrons who utilize loan sharks to obtain their currency.

GPEB Investigations have been supplied with this information. Law Enforcement have this information and intelligence which they have provided to GPEB Investigations who have SPC status. The origin of the information stays with the police and we are bound by police confidentiality. The police will not provide written police intelligence outside the law enforcement universe. JS

Comment [WJM12]: This is a very strong, and specific, statement. Reference is made, in the last paragraph on this page, to police sources providing intelligence on this activity. That paragraph also speaks to organized crime supplying loan sharks with the proceeds of crime to supply gaming patrons. It is imperative that we be supplied with the evidence on which these statements are made, as this is key to the credibility of any position that GPEB may take.

Over the past several years the service providers and BCLC have been vigilant in dealing with loan sharks who were operating within the casinos and who have, for the most part, been removed from the gaming floor and out of the venues. However, loan sharks are increasingly operating out of locations nearby the casinos. They continue to have associates operating as "runners" or "eyes and ears" inside the casinos, ready to contact or alert their loan shark bosses of "patron customers" who will need more money

to continue play. What is now often observed is when a patron is out of money he/she and or the associate make a phone call to a loan shark. The patron leaves the facility, often driven by the associate and/or picked up by the loan shark or his associate, and then departs the facility property. The patron returns within several minutes with a new supply of suspicious currency which is brought into and accepted at the casino. This is continually repeated over and over again at the main casinos in the LMD where high stakes baccarat games are the predominant, if not main game of choice for these patrons.

For JM14 & JM15

GPEB Investigations have been supplied with this information. Law Enforcement have this information and intelligence that they have provided to GPEB Investigations as SPC's. The origin of the information stays with the police and we are bound by police confidentiality. The police will not provide written police intelligence outside the law enforcement universe. The evidence of patrons coming and going from gaming facilities with loan shark associates, making phone calls and observed coming into or returning to facilities with bags of currency is captured on facility video and is observed by casino surveillance staff and reviewed and observed by BCLC Security and GPEB investigators on an ongoing basis. JS

Checking of ID and confirming existing information on file on the subject is not regularly done.

Once the patron is known at the facility there is no regular confirmation of file information. These very large SCTs (\$100,000, \$200,000 or bigger) occur a number of times a week and service providers and BCLC security investigators confirm patrons are not asked about the origin of the currency. JS

Service providers simply follow the BCLC guidelines of "know your customer". The service provider however never asks about or questions the origin of the money that is being brought into the casino.

See JM10 above. JS

Even though patrons will bring in \$100,000, \$200,000 and sometimes up to \$500,000 in cash, many times most of it being in smaller denominations or combinations of \$20.00 bills and larger bills, the origin of the money is not questioned.

We agree. Refer to Page 6: "The 'Know your Client' requirement of the Service Provider at the present time is not sufficient and does not include the critical component of knowing and carrying out appropriate extensive "Due Diligence" on the origin of the

Comment [jm13]: As I assume this report is being provided to me as GM, I would like to see the evidence that supports this behavior. It can be for my eyes only but I need to see it before I will take action in response.

Comment [jm14]: How often? Need to substantiate this finding.

Comment [jm15]: This is a great question. The report provides one possible explanation for the source of these funds. The evidence to support this explanation, however, needs to be provided.

source of the large amounts of suspicious cash funds. The Branch does not yet have a defined Regulation and/or Term and Condition of Registration, specific to Anti-Money Laundering which outlines appropriate regulatory "Due Diligence" and I am of the opinion to meet our overall objective of preserving the integrity and the perception of integrity of gaming that is critical." JS

Regular and ongoing intelligence information from police sources have confirmed that loan sharks are obtaining suspicious currency from Organized Crime (OC) groups who are laundering their proceeds of crime through the use of loan sharks.

Police are responsible for how and when they conduct criminal investigations. We are not privy to when and how those investigations are conducted. At present, we believe that this type of enforcement does not hit the radar of the police due to other more pressing needs and duties in an environment of shortage of finances and of qualified investigative staff. We are meeting with police regularly on criminal intelligence. Investigative procedures by the police and criminal intelligence will not/cannot be shared with service providers and BCLC. Therefore, we (GPEB - Service Provider - BCLC) will always all be operating on different knowledge levels. JS

Comment [WJM16]: Loan sharking is illegal. What are the Police of Jurisdiction doing about this conduct, given the apparent acknowledgement of this known activity that is against the law? Because of statements like this I believe a meeting of a cross-agency group, as described in the Krocker report, would be important to ensure that all parties are working with the same knowledge.

Intelligence information and sources to police have indicated that these OC groups often discount the small denomination currency given to loan sharks, who in turn can also discount suspicious small denomination currency that they provide to patrons using same in casinos. Over the past year or more the proliferation of loan sharks and/or "runners" has become more apparent and disconcerting. This is especially the case at or near various LMD casinos and the business/restaurants/meeting spots in the near vicinity of these casinos.

Information and intelligence has always indicated that loan sharks and their associates are or may themselves be part of other criminal elements and groups. Over the past several months further information and intelligence gathered from various police agencies has confirmed that a number of known loan sharks and "runners" are affiliated to different OC groups. Some of these associates to OC groups have significant and serious criminal backgrounds and associations, including firearms possession.

See WJM 19. Also, service providers are continuously providing BCLC with information that allows BCLC to prohibit undesirable patrons suspected of loan sharking, cash and/or chip passing and other "undesirable" activities. Even though BCLC prohibits patrons, this has no impact on the loan sharking or other related criminal activities, most of which are now occurring outside the gaming facility. JS

Comment [WJM17]: Again, what are the police doing about this? Also, what has been shared with GPEB and BCLC as any issue of safety to the public needs to be taken quite seriously. BCLC has already banned a few (between 5 and 10 I believe) individuals due to concerns about their activities. We know they will take further steps if they are given information that can be acted on.

The presence of these types of individuals could present a potential safety hazard to anyone who personally interacts with them.

See JMI5:

"GPEB Investigations have been supplied with this information. Law Enforcement have this information and intelligence which they have provided to GPEB Investigations who have SPC status. The origin of the information stays with the police and we are bound by police confidentiality. The police will not provide written police intelligence outside the law enforcement universe." JS

Conclusions:

All of the information provided simply reaffirms that an overwhelming amount of suspicious currency, most being in small denominations, continues to flood into casinos in British Columbia, especially in the LMD. As evidenced in the ongoing receipt of large numbers of Section 86 SCT reports, the amount of suspicious currency continues to rise significantly. None of the measures introduced by BCLC, the service provider, the AML X-DWG or a combination of those entities over the past 3 years have stopped or slowed that increase. There continue to be serious concerns about this suspicious currency and how the influx of that currency into our casinos adversely reflects in a significant way on the overall

The statistics on face value indicate that the flow of suspicious currency into casinos has not stopped or slowed and the volume of suspicious currency coming into gaming facilities continues to increase. JS

Comment [WJM18]: These are rather dramatic conclusion statements. We know that AML training has been significantly increased through 2010/2011 and that pressure has been put on CSP's to be very diligent in reporting transactions. To say that 'none of the measures introduced ... have stopped or slowed that increase' may be drawing the wrong conclusion. Cash managed through alternative means, to bringing it in from outside of gaming facilities, is over \$1.2 billion annually. And this is growing with the alternatives being marketed in BC casinos. We know that the 'cash drop' (the amount of money put into the system for gaming) is approximately \$6.2 billion annual, so the money in the S.86 reports is just over 1.5% of that. We also know that the S.86 reporting includes multiple reports of the same funds, as a player cashes out and then later buys back in with the same funds. A review would have to be done in order to determine how much this actually represents.

integrity of gaming in British Columbia.

Agreed and "the perception of the overall integrity of gaming needs to be maintained as well.

See Page 6: "The Branch does not yet have a defined Regulation and/or Term and Condition of Registration, specific to Anti-Money Laundering which outlines appropriate regulatory "Due Diligence" and I am of the opinion to meet our overall objective of preserving the integrity and the perception of integrity of gaming that is critical." JS

Comment [WJM19]: Agreed. We are charged with maintaining the integrity of gaming through the Act and our regulatory role.

**Joe Schalk, Sr. Director
Investigations and Regional Operations
Gaming Policy and Enforcement Branch.**

In the past number of years this Division has collected data, prepared Reports of Findings and has given observations to the Branch and others on suspected money laundering in Casinos in BC. I am not intending to reiterate all the contents of the previous Reports of Findings

The previous Reports of Findings, memoranda and discussions have been forwarded to the ADMs and Bill McCrea. We have also given presentations on ML and proceeds of crime to AMI, X-DWG and the Branch. This includes video clips of SCT activity at gaming venues. I now believe that we need to make another presentation to the AMI group on proceeds of crime and the status of SCT in the Casinos in BC. LVG

"once a transaction or attempted transaction had been deemed "suspicious" and prior to it being complete, the transaction must be refused by the service provider at a commercial gaming facility and immediately reported to GPEB in accordance with Section 86 of the GCA".

The above quote has to be examined in context and was in the 2009 recommendations to address SCT. A Service Provider could refuse as a good corporate citizen, based on the suspicion level of a reasonable person. The Service Provider is not compelled to take suspicious currency. PCMLTF has no bearing on refusal to take or not take suspicious funds. It is simply reporting legislation gathering intelligence for police. I do not agree that it is difficult to turn away suspicious currency, however regulatory change would only force due diligence on the person and the source of the funds. That is what we are saying should be in a Regulation. Refusing funds would be the purview of the Service Provider, but it would be based on the result of due diligence on the funds. I suggest they would have to be reasonably satisfied through legislated due diligence that the funds are not the proceeds of crime prior to any refusal. Should a client answer that the funds were from drug trafficking, loan sharking, had drugs with the money or other criminal activity, the service provider would be taking the cash at a very high risk level. LVG

Training and business practices should result in gaming staff having a clear understanding that the duty to diligently scrutinize all buy-ins for suspicious transactions applies, whether or not a patron is considered to be known to BCLC or the facility operator.

Agreed, and the origin of the cash. A regulation or standard operating procedure would ensure compliance with due diligence. LVG

This recommendation clearly reiterates "Know your Client" which I believe must include knowing the source of your clients suspicious funds (Cash). It is clear that the intent of this recommendation was to scrutinize the source of the funds under the "Know your Client" umbrella. It is not sufficient protection to the integrity of gaming to know your client without specifically

Comment [Jm20]: I need to see these reports if they provide the information evidence I indicate I need to see in my above comments.

Comment [WJM21]: There is a fundamental question of what basis would a CSP refuse a transaction? The 'Proceeds of Crime ...' law (PCMLTFA) does not allow disclosure of reports being made through this Act. It is against that law. So this makes it quite difficult for the CSP to turn the buy-in away. I believe that refusal of a transaction would have to have the support of a Gaming Regulation or a Ministerial Directive. At this point we do not have such requirements in place.

Comment [WJM22]: Agreed, for Know Your Customer (KYC) diligence.

Comment [WJM23]: The Kroeker report speaks to "verifying the source of the funds ... should only be made by the enforcement agencies with a mandate to conduct these types of inquiries." (p10). Will the Police of Jurisdiction become involved in verifying the legitimacy of cash?

The Police of Jurisdiction are responsible for gathering evidence to prove criminal charges on matters such as money laundering and proceeds of crime. It is not a police function to do due diligence in relation to the legitimacy or origin of cash. We believe the due diligence including the origin of the cash rests with the service provider. LVG

Recent conversations with corporate security in the banking community re-enforces that even a greater "Due Diligence" is warranted in the present world climate and is being stringently exercised by front line staff in Financial Institutions in relation to attempted large deposits of Cash.

I have previously met over the years with BCLC, service providers and the Head of Civil Forfeiture in this regard. Agreed, there are differences of opinion for a variety of reasons. However, the bottom line is, "Is the service provider prepared to do due diligence on the large amounts of SCTs that enter the gaming venues?" I refer to Page 6: "The 'Know your Client' requirement of the Service Provider at the present time is not sufficient and does not include the critical component of knowing and carrying out appropriate extensive 'Due Diligence' on the origin of the source of the large amounts of suspicious cash. The Branch does not yet have a defined Regulation and/or Term and Condition of Registration, specific to Anti-Money Laundering which outlines appropriate regulatory 'Due Diligence' and I am of the opinion to meet our overall objective of preserving the integrity and the perception of integrity of gaming that is critical." This due diligence on the suspicious currency has to be the cornerstone of regulatory oversight. LVG

However, those initiatives along with other initiatives have not reduced the volume of suspicious cash nor the number of Suspicious Currency Transactions in BC Casinos.

Same answer as WJM22: The statistics on face value generally indicate that the flow of suspicious currency into casinos has not stopped or slowed significantly. LVG

They were requesting that casino cheques be issued to patrons that had entered with large amounts of currency, put their money at risk and then left the casino.

This Division has previously disagreed with that policy change for a number of reasons on numerous occasions due to the huge risk of completing the money laundering circle. Any large cheque issuance should only be considered when it is from a completely documented "verified win" or a very minor amount for a specific reason. LVG

ADM Doug Scott has previously addressed that request but I am of the opinion it will surface again.

Comment [WJM24]: More reason for holding a cross-agency meeting. Let us get the various thoughts, and facts, out on the table.

Comment [WJM25]: We know that the use of cash alternatives continues to grow and now represents over 20% of funds used in gaming at BC facilities. Comments have been made earlier that explain some of the increase in suspicious reporting. Also, this increase in reporting may not be direct evidence that illicit funds are being brought into BC casinos at a greater rate. No more than reducing this reporting would be evidence that this has been reduced.

Comment [WJM26]: This is a recommendation from the Kroeker report, which BCLC also believes is a correct approach to deterring money laundering risk. It is being discussed from various points of view as there are conflicting opinions about the validity of this strategy. This is not finished yet.

Comment [jm27]: I need to know the background and action taken here.

ADM Doug Scott previously addressed this with a letter to BCLC explaining his rationale and the significant risk this change would bring. We agree with this rationale and can discuss this with you. LVG

In closing, I am of the opinion that the influx of large amounts of cash into BC Casinos has not been reduced. That "Loan Sharks" or runners are providing horrendous

Comment [WJM28]: What can be proven? What are Police of Jurisdiction saying and doing about this?

I consider \$250,000 in small bills (\$20) being carried into a casino in a hockey duffle bag or equivalent sports bag, wrapped in \$10,000 bundles as a horrendous amount of cash being provided to a gambler, especially when the service provider does not ask the origin of the cash.

Any police of jurisdiction that have been shown various videos of this type of activity at or near a gaming facility have asked, "How can the casino take that money?" That question is very difficult if not impossible to answer, because the service provider is not mandated by the regulator to ask the origin of the suspicious currency (due diligence). You must also keep in mind that the service provider reports this to GPEB as a SCT. LVG

It is critical that we meet our overall objective of preserving the integrity and the perception of integrity of gaming. LVG

Larry Vander Graaf, Executive Director
Investigations and Regional Operations

Comment [WJM29]: In closing, I believe that it is imperative that this work proceed with disclosure of evidence and broader expert collaboration to aid our next steps. There are differing schools of thought that are being put forward with respect to the nature of the issue, the size of the challenge and solutions. My comments throughout this document speak to understanding input from the broad community and using this to build next steps, that "will prevent money laundering in gaming ... and ... respect or enhance our responsible gambling practices and the health of the industry."

Bill McCrea

This Division has reviewed the comments and has tried to provide some clarity to the comments. The first portion of the report comments were responded to by Senior Director Joe Schalk, as he was the author of that portion of the report. I authored the second portion of the document.

We are continuously being asked "prove that the money is the proceeds of crime." I would like to comment further on the "proof" aspect that reverberates through the comments. To prove that the funds in question are the proceeds of crime would require a judicial decision after weighing a flotilla of evidence. From a purely legal perspective to say that the funds in question are positively the "proceeds of crime" requires evidence that meets the "beyond a reasonable doubt" test. If that test could be met, someone would be arrested and hopefully be going to jail by now. That is a test that would have to be achieved by the police and that test is out of reach by all at this time. As previously stated this is not on the police radar at this time for a number of reasons.

Generally, to seize the funds for civil forfeiture the proof level would have to be "on the balance of probability". The seizure of these funds would not be entertained by the civil forfeiture office for a number of reasons. The police would have to do the legwork and as previously stated that is not on their radar.

GPEB does not have the resources or the ability to investigate major, potentially dangerous criminal activity. Therefore, neither proof levels of "beyond a reasonable doubt" nor "balance of probabilities" are likely to be achieved at this time.

That said, GPEB as the regulator is responsible for the integrity of gaming and the oversight of gaming and I believe that GPEB has an immediate role in this situation. I suggest that role is to ensure the overall integrity of gaming and or the perception of the integrity of gaming. That is in the AML strategy document.

What I am saying is that the burden of proof to prove that money is in legal fact the proceeds of crime is very high. However based on certain criteria it can be said that the cash funds can be reasonably believed to be the proceeds of crime. Illicit Drug activity in BC is a 6-7 billion dollar per year industry. It is commonly known that drug trafficking is normally conducted in cash and smaller bills (\$20 bills) are generally the bill of choice at street level. Volumes of cash and weight of cash are a major problem for drug traffickers. I am of the opinion that it is reasonable to believe that the reported SCT cash funds coming into the casinos probably originates from drug proceeds. I cannot prove that beyond a reasonable doubt nor on the balance of probabilities at this time and may never be able to reach that level of proof. However, I believe that to ensure integrity of gaming due diligence on the origin of funds at the entry point is appropriate and necessary. I am of the opinion that the influx of large amounts of suspicious cash into BC Casinos has not been reduced. That "Loan Sharks" or runners are providing large amounts of unexplained cash to gamblers. I believe that most of the "Loan Sharks" and runners have extensive criminal records and are associated to other criminal groups or organizations. The business of supplying suspicious currency that enters BC Casinos in huge amounts is provided by these loan sharks through other criminal associates. The service providers are appropriately complying with the legal requirement of reporting Suspicious Currency Transactions to this Division. The "Know your Client" requirement of the Service Provider at the present time is not sufficient and does not include the critical component of knowing and carrying out appropriate extensive "Due Diligence" on the origin of the source of the large amounts of suspicious cash funds. The Branch does not yet have a defined Regulation and/or Term and Condition of Registration, specific to Anti-Money Laundering which outlines appropriate regulatory "Due Diligence" and I am of the opinion to meet our overall objective of preserving the integrity and the perception of integrity of gaming that is critical. The question I continue to ask and numerous others ask, "why would we not ask the patron the origin of suspicious cash and conduct further due diligence to ensure the integrity or the perception of integrity in gaming". To answer that it is OK to take these large amounts of suspicious cash without asking the origin of the cash leaves the gaming industry open to severe criticism and negative public scrutiny. It also leaves an open invitation to organized crime to further infiltrate the casino environment with large amounts of suspicious cash.

My opinion...

Historic bust: Vancouver police seize \$3M worth of cocaine



Vancouver police seize \$3M in cocaine
VPD officers showed off 54 kilograms of cocaine worth an estimated \$3-million at its morning media briefing Tuesday.

Vancouver police seize \$3M in cocaine
More than three million dollars worth seized from a Vancouver apartment this weekend.

CTV BC: Flash grenade takedown linked to drug raid
A busy street in downtown Vancouver has been linked to a drug raid Friday afternoon.

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CTV British Columbia
Published Tuesday, November 12, 2013 12:22PM PST
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It's believed to be one of the biggest busts the Vancouver police have ever seen.

Guarded by officers toting assault rifles, VPD officers showed off 54 kilograms of cocaine worth an estimated \$3-million at a media briefing Tuesday morning.

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